Grammar and Function: Peter Geach’s Ethics

Geach is best known for his contributions to theoretical philosophy: Most of his more than one hundred papers and a dozen books are on logic, philosophy of language and metaphysics. But he also made significant contributions to ethics. Particularly influential were a series of short metaethics papers, which are small masterpieces, both in terms of philosophical content and style. In usually less than ten pages, Geach delivers sharp analyses and powerful objections against influential schools. His arguments are always so clear and his examples so simple that they leave the reader wondering why no one before Geach detected the problems he points out.

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The logic of Logic and the Basis of Ethics

“Ethics, a Matter of Style?”. Bernard Williams and the Nietzschean Legacy

Introduction

Notes

I am grateful to Dr. Ulf Hlobil for pointing out the parallel discussed in this paragraph to me. He also alerted me to the fact that Kit Fine’s “Essence and Modality” (Philosophical Perspectives 1994) introduces a thesis for alethic modality that is largely analogous to Geach’s claim about deontic expressions.

See §§ 2–4. More explicit references are to be found in the introductions of Frege’s various unfinished attempts to provide an overview of his work, such as Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren, Einleitung in die Logik and Meine grundlegenden logischen Einsichten.

Important papers are Anscombe’s early “On Brute Facts” (Analysis 1958), as well as Searle’s more often-cited “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’” (Philosophical Review 1964).

See his Treatise on Human Nature, 3.1.1, §9. (The expression “naturalistic fallacy” is by G. E. Moore.)

Both books are by British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and are explicitly anti-teleological.

Annotated Bibliography

• As mentioned in the introduction, ethics was only one of the many fields in which Geach published. The following bibliography hence only lists a very small selection of his enormous work. Google Scholar

Contributions to Ethics

• (1956). Good and evil. Analysis, 17(2), 33–42. Google Scholar
• (1958). Imperative and Deontic Logic. Analysis, 18(3), 49–56. Google Scholar
• Opposes Hare’s attempt to construct a logic of moral utterances solely from imperatives. Geach says that many moral utterances have a fundamentally different logical structure and can hence not be rendered as imperatives. (One example are permissions.)Google Scholar
• (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review, 69(2), 221–225. Google Scholar
• (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review, 74(4), 449–465. Google Scholar
• (1975a). Teleological Explanation. In P. Achinstein & S. Körner (Eds.), Explanation: Papers and Discussions (pp. 76–95). New Haven, Yale University Press. Google Scholar
• (1975b). Reply to Comments. In P. Achinstein & S. Körner (Eds.), Explanation: Papers and Discussions (pp. 112–117). New Haven, Yale University Press. Google Scholar
• (1976a). Murder and Sodomy. Philosophy, 51(197), 346–348. Google Scholar
• (1976b). Morally Significant Theses. Open Mind(The Philosophy Journal of the Open University),4, 20–26. Google Scholar
• (1977a). The Virtues (The Stanton Lectures 1973–74). Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
• (1977b). Again the Logic of “Ought”. Philosophy, 52(202), 473–476. Google Scholar
• A reply to critiques of Geach 1976a and b (see “Secondary Literature”).Google Scholar
• (1979). Some Hobbesian Theses about Justice. Dialectics and Humanism, 6(4), 45–50. Google Scholar
• Geach’s political views were deeply influenced by Hobbes. Here, he defends Hobbes’ view of justice within a state.Google Scholar
• (1982a). Moral Autonomy Still Refuted. Philosophy, 57(219), 127–129. Google Scholar
• A further reply to critiques of Geach 1976a and b. (“Autonomy” here refers to the autonomy of ethics alleged by Hare and others, i.e., the impossibility of inferring ethical from non-ethical judgments.)Google Scholar
• (1982b). Whatever Happened to Deontic Logic? Philosophia, 11(1), 1–12. Google Scholar
• Reprinted in: Geach, P., & Hołowka, J. (Eds.). (1991). Logic and Ethics (Nijhoff International Philosophy Series 41) (pp. 33–48). Dordrecht: Springer. Google Scholar
• (2001). Truth and Hope (The Fürst Franz-Josef and Fürstin Gina Lectures 1998). Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press. Google Scholar
• Develops some earlier themes of Geach’s work, mostly his theory of truth, but in chapters 4 and 5, Geach returns to his views on lying and promising introduced in Geach 1977a, chapter 6.Google Scholar
• (2002). Contingency, Cause, and End. In T. Buchheim, R. Schönberger, & W. Schweidler (Eds.), Die Normativität des Wirklichen. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. Google Scholar

Secondary Literature on Geach’s Moral Philosophy (Selection)

• Hare, R. (1957). Geach: Good and Evil. Analysis, 17(5), 103–111. Google Scholar
• Searle, J. (1962). Meaning and Speech Acts. The Philosophical Review, 71(4), 423–432. Google Scholar
• Part I treats the same problem as Geach 1960 and 1965. Searle gives examples in which “good” is embedded, and he shows that the meaning of “good” in these cases cannot be that the speaker recommends something.Google Scholar
• Winch, P. (1975). Comment: Geach on Teleological Explanation. In P. Achinstein & S. Körner (Eds.), Explanation: Papers and Discussions (pp. 95–105). New Haven, Yale University Press. Google Scholar
• Henry, G. (1975). Comment. In P. Achinstein & S. Körner (Eds.), Explanation: Papers and Discussions (pp. 105–112). New Haven: Yale University Press. Google Scholar
• Hare, R. (1977). Geach on Murder and Sodomy. Philosophy, 52(202), 467–472. Google Scholar
• A reply to Geach’s counterexamples against the supposed naturalistic fallacy in Geach 1976a and b. Geach 1977b is a brief rejection of this and the following paper:Google Scholar
• Borowski, E. J. (1977). A Pyrrhic Defence of Moral Autonomy. Philosophy, 52(202), 455–466. Google Scholar
• Borowski, E. J. (1980). Moral Autonomy Fights Back. Philosophy, 55(211), 95–100. Google Scholar
• A reply to Geach 1977b. Geach 1982a is a brief rejection of this and the following paper:Google Scholar
• Hurka, T. (1980). Geach on Deriving Categorical “Oughts”. Philosophy, 55(211), 101–104. Google Scholar
• Karmo, T. (1988). Some Valid (but Not Sound) Arguments Trivially Span the “Is”-“Ought” Gap. Mind, 97(386), 252–257. Google Scholar
• Attempts to circumvent the problems raised in Geach 1976a and b through a model on which the same judgments count as moral judgments in some possible worlds but not in others.Google Scholar
• MacIntyre, A. (2002). Virtues in Foot and Geach. Philosophical Quarterly, 52(209), 621–631. ArticleGoogle Scholar
• Compares the theory of the virtues in Geach 2001 with that of Philippa Foot in Natural Goodness (Oxford University Press 2001).Google Scholar
• Haldane, J. (2002). Truth and Hope, by Peter Geach. Journal of Philosophy, 99(3), 157–162. Google Scholar
• A critical overview of the main theses in Geach 2001.Google Scholar
• Schroeder, M. (2008). What Is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass, 3(4), 703–720. Google Scholar
• A contemporary, accessible overview of the original formulations of the problem by Geach and Searle and of the ensuing debates, solely treating ethics.Google Scholar
• Thomson, J. J. (2008). Normativity (The Paul Carus Lectures 2003). Peru: Open Court. Google Scholar
• Chapters 1 and 2 elaborate the main theses from Geach 1956.Google Scholar
• Schroeder, M. (2011). Ought, Agents, and Actions. Philosophical Review, 120(1), 1–41. Google Scholar
• Defends the thesis developed in Geach 1982b that “ought” does not (always) refer to facts or situations.Google Scholar
• Charlow, N. (2014). The Problem with the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies, 167(3), 635–665. Google Scholar
• A contemporary stock-check of which expressivist theories are refuted by which version of the Frege-Geach problem (as well as a new suggestion for a variant of expressivism designed to circumvent it).Google Scholar
• Rowland, R. (2016). In Defence of Good Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies, 173(5), 1371–1391. Google Scholar
• A contemporary attempt to reject Geach 1956 as well as later elaborations (e.g., by J. J. Thomson or Foot).Google Scholar

About Peter Geach

• Lewis, Harry (Ed.) (1991). Peter Geach: Philosophical Encounters. Essays by Peter Geach and Others. Dordrecht: Kluwer/Springer. Google Scholar
• A Festschrift of 330 pages, which also contains a highly readable “Philosophical Autobiography” (pp. 1–25), as well as a bibliography of Geach’s works up till 1989 (pp. 307–315). The bibliography can be accessed here:link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm:978-94-015-7885-1/1.pdf.
• The book is divided into three topics, “History of Philosophy,” “Logic and Identity” and “Philosophy of Religion.” Each begins with a short introduction by Geach, followed by papers by colleagues—among them Quine, Anscombe and Müller. In the last section, Geach replies to these papers.Google Scholar
• Haldane, J. (2016). Anscombe and Geach on Mind and the Soul. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 90(16), 369–394. Google Scholar
• Investigates Geach’s and Anscombe’s early philosophical works as well as how they influenced each other.Google Scholar
• Several obituaries appeared after Geach’s death. The following two are especially recommended:Google Scholar
• O’Grady, J. Peter Geach Obituary. The Guardian, December 26, 2013 (revised December 27): https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/dec/26/peter-geach
• [No author]: Emeritus Professor Peter T. Geach. The University of Leeds, Obituaries 2014. https://www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/obituaries/2014/geach_peter.html